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Abstract 
 In this paper, I examine the influence of the investment bank’s 
reputation on the price of underwriting services of Chinese firm. Based on a 
sample of offers from 2004-2015, the results show that prestigious 
investment banks charge higher fees. Furthermore, in comparison to big 
firms, prestigious investment banks charge more underwriting fees for small 
firms. In comparison to state-owned firms, high-reputation investment 
banks charge higher underwriting fees for non-state-owned firms. The 
results indicate that the investment bank’s reputation capital is different for 
different firms. For firms with more information problems, the reputation of 
investment banks is more valuable. 
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Introduction 
In mature capital markets, the reputation of investment banks has been 
proven to be able to reduce the information asymmetry between financial 
intermediaries and investors. Furthermore, the underwriting qualities of 
investment banks are not directly observed by investors. Investment banks, 
through strict evaluation standards, help to ensure that customers do not 
have a negative image about them. Hence, this is with the aim of 
establishing its reputation. The impressively loud reputation of investment 
banks are used to release positive signals to the market, raising the issue of 
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the likelihood of success, and reducing the cost of financing. As a result, 
high-reputation investment banks can obtain reputation rents as well as 
charge higher underwriting fees. However, this reputation premium can also 
encourage investment banks to maintain a higher certification quality, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of the emergence of lemon firms 
(Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Booth & Smith, 1986; Fang, 2005). 
This notwithstanding, the reputation mechanism of investment banks 
may be challenged in China's capital market. There is no consensus on 
whether high reputation investment banks can get a reputation premium. 
Therefore, the following could be the reason: first of all, China's capital 
market is highly regulated by the central government, especially when it 
comes to stock. The enterprises approved by the government are able to 
issue shares. Also, the issue price still needs to be guided by the government. 
Therefore, there are questions about the influence of investment banks’ 
reputation on the issuer’s cost of capital. The premise that the issuer is 
willing to pay a premium for the investment bank's reputation does not 
exist.  
Secondly, investment banks face negligible litigation risks in China. 
This is because the court only accepts fraud case allegations after the 
government has already sanctioned the issuer or the investment bank for 
fraud. There has never been a case of shareholder litigation against an 
investment bank due to IPO fraud. 
Thirdly, government penalties for violations by investment banks are 
relatively light. China’s securities regulatory authorities introduced the 
sponsor system form of ATM market in the UK and Hong Kong markets. 
Investment banks have sponsor qualification and are responsible for 
recommending the listed companies. They also continue to monitor the 
company’s disclosure behavior listed within two years. If the violation 
occurs, the sponsor must bear some responsibility and will be punished by 
the regulatory authorities. Although there are investment banks which have 
been punished by the government because of poor sponsor quality, most of 
the punishment is not severe. The three months suspension issued for 
sponsor qualification is by far the most stringent penalties for investment 
banks. So given this legal and regulatory environment, it is not clear 
whether investment banks have sufficient incentive to provide high 
certification and underwriting quality service. 
Consequently, we seek to shed light on whether the investment bank's 
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reputation mechanism is effective and whether the reputation capital exists 
under the poor legal and regulatory environment. For a sample of IPO 
offers from 2004-2015, I discovered that high reputable investment banks 
match with bigger and lower leverage issuers. This indicates that loud 
investment banks select low risky firms in order to avoid damage to their 
reputation. Prestigious investment banks charge higher underwriting fees, 
especially for the smaller and non-state owned IPO issuers. Hence, this 
indicate that there is a reputation premium in Chinese IPO underwriting 
market. This also shows that the premium is more valuable for the high 
uncertainty firms. 
This paper has two contributions. First, the previous evidences of the 
relationship between investment banks’ reputation and underwriting fees are 
mainly from developed financial markets. This means higher litigation risks 
and stringent government regulation. This paper provides the evidence of 
reputation capital under the low litigation risk and loose government 
regulation. Second, I analyzed when the reputation capital is more valuable. 
The results show that the smaller and non-state owned issuers give 
investment banks’ reputation more rent. Therefore, this reflects the role of 
reputation in solving information problems.           
Therefore, this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I review the 
relevant literature. In section 3, I specify the research design. In section 4, I 
present the sample selection process and descriptive statistics. In section 5, I 
report the empirical results, and conclude on this paper in section 6. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1994) modeled reputation acquisition by 
investment banks in equity market. They showed that investment banks’ 
reputation is established by adopting stringent evaluation standards. In 
equilibrium, high-reputation investment banks underwrite less-risk firms 
and receive higher compensation. Booth & Smith (1986) argued that 
investment banks’ reputation acts as a bonding mechanism which can 
reduce the information asymmetry between the intermediary and the 
investor. 
For sample of IPO offers during 1980-1983, James (1992) showed that 
reputable investment banks charge lower underwriting fees. Fang (2005) 
examined the relationship between investment banks’ reputation and the 
price and quality of bond underwriting services. After controlling the 
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endogeneity in issuer and underwriter choice, the results showed that 
reputable investment banks charge higher underwriting fees. Burch et al. 
(2005) examined the effects of underwriting relationships on the fees 
charged. The results showed that issuers’ loyalty to an investment bank is 
associated with lower fees for common stock offers, and firms that graduate 
to higher-quality banks face lower fees. Yasuda (2005) examined the effect 
of bank relationships on the firm’s underwriter choice and underwriting fees 
in the corporate-bond market. The results show that underwriting fees were 
significantly lower when there were relationships between firms and 
commercial banks.  
Butler et al. (2009) examined the effect of political connections on the 
underwriting fees in municipal offers. The results showed that underwriting 
fees were significantly higher during a time when the underwriter made 
political contributions to win underwriting business. 
 
3. Methodology  
To examine the relationship between investment banks’ reputation and 
the underwriting fees, the following models were estimated. 
SPREAD=REPU+CENTR_INST+LNAMOT+SIZE+LEV+GROWTH+OP
ROA+CHOPNI+ 
YEAR+IND+IB   (1) 
SPREAD is the gross spread divided by the total proceeds raised. 
REPU is the underwriter’s reputation variables. If the investment 
bank’s IPO business market share ranks in the top ten percent in year t-1, 
the variable is equal to 1. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. If the estimated 
coefficient of the variable is significantly positive, it indicates that the 
high-reputation investment banks charge higher underwriting fees. 
CENTR_UW: An investment bank is defined to be central 
government-controlled if the immediate largest shareholder of the 
investment bank is the Ministry of Finance or State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). China's financial 
market is highly regulated by the central government. As a result, we adopt 
the central government holding company as an alternative to the political 
relationship. If the estimated coefficient of this variable is significantly 
positive, it indicates that the investment bank's political relationship can 
obtain underwriting premium. 
LNAMOT is the natural logarithm of the total proceeds raised for each 
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IPO issue; SYN is an indicator set to one if the offer is syndicated, and set 
to zero if otherwise; AGE_FIRM is the age of the IPO issuer; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets in pre-IPO year; GROWTH is the 
annual sales growth rate in pre-IPO year; LEV is the total debts divided by 
total assets in pre-IPO year; OPROA is the annual operating income divided 
by the average total assets in pre-IPO year; CHOPNI is the change in 
operating income in IPO year divided by operating income in pre-IPO year; 
GEM is equal to 1 if the company applies for listing on the GEM, otherwise 
it is equal to 0; SMB is equal to 1 if the company is listed on the SME board 
market, otherwise it is equal to 0; Year is year dummy variable; IND is 
industry dummy variable; and IB is investment bank dummy variable. 
 
4. Sample Selection Process and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 details our sample selection procedures for IPO firms. We limit 
our sample to the period of 2004-2015, because the sponsor system was 
implemented from the beginning of 2004. Finally, we have 1322 IPO issuers. 
The data of this paper comes from WIND. 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedures 
 Total 
Initial sample of IPO firms over the period of 2004-2015  1552 
Excluding firms of underwriting fees and financial data loss (137) 
Excluding firms of actual controller data loss (95) 
Final sample 1322 
 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean of 
spread is 6%, the minimum value is 1%, and the maximum value is 15%. 
On average, 48% of issuers choose high-reputation investment banks, and 
28% of firms’ underwriters are controlled by the central government. 17% 
of issuers are state-owned firms. The mean of operating income change rate 
is -78%, reflecting the decline of performance of companies after IPO. 32% 
of IPO companies are listed on the GEM board, and 50% of IPO companies 
are listed on the SMB board. Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix 
for the regression variables. In addition, there is a significant correlation 
between the explanatory variables. Thus, I determined whether there was a 
severe multicollinearity for the regression models. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
SPREAD 1322 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.03 
REPU 1322 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
CENTR_UW 1322 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 
LNAMOT 1322 20.28 18.70 19.60 20.09 20.66 24.57 1.05 
SYN 1322 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.19 
SOE 1322 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 
AGE_FIRM 1322 9.85 -1.00 6.00 9.00 13.00 44.00 5.12 
SIZE 1322 20.53 18.58 19.59 20.14 20.88 28.17 1.62 
LEV 1322 0.48 0.08 0.34 0.47 0.60 0.96 0.18 
GROWTH 1322 0.25 -0.25 0.08 0.21 0.36 1.31 0.26 
OPROA 1322 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.42 0.08 
CHOPNI 1322 -0.78 -57.27 -0.81 0.00 1.03 28.26 9.25 
GEM 1322 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 
SMB 1322 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
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Table 3. The Pearson correlation matrix for the regression variables 
 SPREA
D 
REPU CENTR_INS
T 
LNAMO
T 
SYN SOE AGE_FIR
M 
SIZE LEV GROWT
H 
OPRO
A 
CHOPN
I 
SPREAD 1            
REPU 0.0262 1           
CENTR_INS
T 
-0.1498* 0.0309 1          
LNAMOT -0.5776* 0.1162
* 
0.2443* 1         
SYN -0.2826* 0.0325 0.1924* 0.6392* 1        
SOE -0.2750* 0.0042 0.1991* 0.3644* 0.3797* 1       
AGE_FIRM 0.1704* -0.018
2 
-0.0149 0.0345 0.1090* -0.0477 1      
SIZE -0.4170* 0.0606 0.2401* 0.8114* 0.7210* 0.4942* 0.1280* 1     
LEV -0.3088* -0.052
6 
0.0822* 0.3163* 0.3280* 0.2851* 0.0164 0.5640* 1    
GROWTH -0.1069* 0.0288 0.0064 0.034 -0.0484 -0.0466 -0.1275* -0.0893
* 
0.0516 1   
OPROA 0.0462 0.057 -0.0335 -0.0741* -0.2341
* 
-0.2645
* 
-0.0878* -0.4503
* 
-0.6204
* 
0.2384* 1  
CHOPNI -0.0800* 0.0107 -0.0026 0.0934* 0.0971* 0.0586 -0.0515 0.1110* 0.0446 -0.0244 -0.0066 1 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1% 
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5. Empirical Results 
The correlation between issuer and underwriter is endogenous 
(Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Fang, 2005). Before examining how 
investment banks affect underwriting fees, I explored the factors that explain 
the choice of investment bank for the IPO issuers. Understanding these 
factors can help identify important control variables when investigating the 
relationship between the investment banks’ reputation and the underwriting 
fees. Table 4 reports the results of the factors which affect the underwriter’s 
choice and the dependent variable of the investment banks’ reputation 
indicator. The detailed definition of variables is consistent with section 3. 
The estimated coefficient of LNAMOT is significantly positive, and the 
estimated coefficient of LEV is significantly negative. Hence, this indicate 
that high reputable investment banks are more likely to choose less risky 
firms. 
Table 4. The determination of underwriter choice 
 (1) 
 REPU 
LNAMOT 0.295** 
 (2.55) 
SOE -0.155 
 (-0.90) 
AGE_FIRM -0.010 
 (-0.85) 
SIZE 0.024 
 (0.27) 
LEV -1.181*** 
 (-2.62) 
GROWTH 0.244 
 (1.06) 
OPROA -0.165 
 (-0.15) 
CHOPNI -0.124 
 (-0.84) 
_cons -5.903*** 
 (-4.81) 
N 1322 
pseudo R2 0.018 
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t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 5 reports the regression results. In models 1 and 2, the estimated 
coefficient of REPU is significantly positive. This indicates that the 
high-reputation investment banks charge higher underwriting fees. The 
estimated coefficient of CENTR_UW is insignificantly negative, indicating 
that the actual controllers of investment banks do not significantly affect the 
underwriting fees. The estimated coefficient of CHOPNI is significantly 
negative. This indicates that the underwriting fees of better performance 
firms are lower. As a result, the investment banks can determine the 
underwriting expense according to the customer's performance. The 
estimated coefficient of GEM is significantly positive, indicating that 
investment banks charge more underwriting fees for the firms listed in GEM 
board. 
Next, I examined how the investment bank charges underwriting fees 
for different scale companies. Model 3 adds the cross variable of investment 
reputation and the firm’s scale variable (REPU*SIZE). The estimated 
coefficient of the cross variable is significantly negative, indicating that 
high-reputation investment banks charge higher underwriting fees for small 
scale enterprises. In turn, small businesses are willing to pay more for a high 
reputation investment banks. 
I also examined if there exists any significant difference between the 
state-owned and non-state owned firms in the effects of investment banks’ 
reputation on the underwriting fees. Model 4 adds the cross variable of 
investment banks reputation and non-state owned variable (REPU*NSOE). 
The estimated coefficient of the cross variable is significantly positive, 
indicating that high-reputation investment banks charge more underwriting 
fees for non-state owned firms. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, I examined the relationship between the investment bank’s 
reputation and the underwriting fees. The results show that high-reputation 
investment banks’ charge more underwriting fees, reflecting the reputation 
capital of investment banks in Chinese IPO underwriting market. Next, I 
found that, when comparing big firms, high-reputation investment banks 
charge higher underwriting fees for small firms. Comparing state-owned 
European Scientific Journal June 2016 edition vol.12, No.16  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
507 
firms, high-reputation investment banks charge higher underwriting fees for 
non-state-owned firms. The results indicate that the investment bank’s 
reputation capital is different for different firms. For the firms with more 
information problems, the reputation of investment banks is more valuable. 
Table 5. Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
REPU 0.004** 0.003* 0.029** -0.001 
 (2.30) (1.80) (2.16) (-0.25) 
REPU*SIZE   -0.001**  
   (-1.97)  
REPU*NSOE    0.005* 
    (1.72) 
CENTR_UW  -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 
  (-1.40) (-1.43) (-1.48) 
LNAMOT  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
  (-10.17) (-10.15) (-10.14) 
SYN  0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
  (4.33) (4.24) (4.23) 
NSOE  0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.47) (0.48) (-0.67) 
AGE_FIRM  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.57) (0.43) (0.45) 
SIZE  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.35) (-0.78) (-1.33) 
LEV  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.01) (0.05) (-0.02) 
GROWTH  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.50) 
OPROA  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  (-0.62) (-0.65) (-0.66) 
CHOPNI  -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
  (-1.72) (-1.71) (-1.74) 
GEM  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (3.99) (3.99) (4.00) 
SMB  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (1.22) (1.22) (1.26) 
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_cons 0.051** 0.338*** 0.326*** 0.339*** 
 (2.07) (12.85) (12.14) (12.90) 
N 1322 1322 1322 1322 
R2 0.495 0.656 0.657 0.657 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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